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Congress justified the recent reform of federal welfare policy in part by citing the increase in the
AFDC caseload since the late 1960s. The caseload, i.e., the number of families using AFDC, is determined
by the number of families eligible to participate and by the proportion of these families who use the
program. Yet the debate over reforming welfare rarely paid attention to the latter—the participation rates
among female heads of families. While the number of cases changed little during the early to mid-1980s,
the percentage of families with single female heads who used AFDC declined. During the late 1980s and
early 1990s, both caseloads and participation rates increased. This paper documents the changes in
participation rates since the mid-1980s, racial and ethnic differences in participation rates, and factors that
might be associated with these changes. The only major trend that consistently parallels the changes in
participation rates is the trend in unemployment. Existing data do not permit us to conclude that
unemployment is the major determinant of participation rates. If unemployment drives participation rates,
however, the recent changes in welfare legislation may create serious problems for many female heads of
families in periods of high unemployment.Trends in AFDC Participation Rates:
The Implications for Welfare Reform
The public debate over reforming welfare often referred to trends in the AFDC caseload as
evidence that the AFDC system needed to be reformed. The House of Representatives conference report on
the recent federal welfare reforms, for example, pointed out that the number of children receiving AFDC
benefits had increased from 3,300,000 in 1965 to 6,200,000 in 1970 to 7,400,000 in 1980, and then to
9,300,000 in 1992 (Congressional Record, Tuesday, July 30, 1996, p. H8831). Much of the increased
caseload is due to changes in the percentage of children residing in single-parent families, which rose from
8 percent in 1965 to 22 percent in 1992 (Hernandez 1993).
Moffitt (1992) pointed out that much of the growth in the size of the caseload occurred between
1965 and 1975. Between 1975 and 1985, on the other hand, the size of the caseload remained about the
same. Since 1985, the caseload has increased, from 7,615,000 children in 1985 to 9,300,000 children in
1992, or from 3,692 cases (families) in 1985 to 4,769 cases in 1992 (U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Ways and Means 1993).
The numbers of children and cases receiving AFDC reflect a number of factors, two of which are
the number of children living with single female heads and the proportion of these families that use AFDC.
The committee report on the federal welfare reform legislation includes a careful discussion of trends in the
number of children living with single female heads, but says almost nothing about the trends in the
participation of these families in AFDC. As Moffitt (1992) showed, the percentage of female heads with
children who received AFDC rose from 36 percent in 1967 to 63 percent in 1973 and declined to 42
percent in 1987. The reduction in participation rates began in the 1970s, with a major reduction occurring
between 1981 and 1982 because of changes in eligibility criteria for AFDC introduced in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981. As we show below, participation rates increased during the
late 1980s and early 1990s.2
The information on the number of AFDC cases is released each year, but the government provides
no information on participation rates. Nonetheless, information on participation rates is an important part
of what we should consider in evaluating the operation of the AFDC program and in considering the likely
impact of the new welfare reform legislation on families with single female heads.
In this paper, we ask two questions about participation in the AFDC program: (1) what have been
the trends in participation rates during the late 1980s and early 1990s? and (2) what factors are associated
with trends in participation rates? The answers to these questions provide information on what we might
anticipate to be some of the effects of the recent federal welfare reform.
WHAT HAVE BEEN THE TRENDS IN CASELOADS AND PARTICIPATION RATES DURING
THE LATE 1980S AND THE EARLY 1990S?
Moffitt (1992) investigated trends in AFDC participation rates over the period 1967–1987. Among
female heads with children, he found a tremendous increase in AFDC participation rates between 1967 and
1973, followed by a decline between 1973 and 1987. Similarly, Jencks (1992) investigated patterns of
AFDC receipt over the period 1960–1988 and found the same pattern: a substantial increase in
participation rates from 1960–1972, followed by a more gradual, but significant decline over the period
1972–1988.
We build on the preceding analyses by investigating patterns of receipt separately for whites,
blacks, and Hispanics and by updating trends in AFDC receipt by focusing on the period 1983–1992. We
update some of Moffitt’s descriptive findings for the period 1988–1992, and finally, we attempt to uncover
factors which are associated with patterns of AFDC participation.
We estimated participation rates by dividing the number of regular AFDC cases (excluding AFDC-
UP cases, that is, cases with two parents in the household) by the population of female heads of families.
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Data on the average monthly caseload come from the Department of Health and Human Services,3
Administration for Children and Families. These data are based on agency reports from each state. Data on
the racial composition of the caseload come from the National Integrated Quality Control System. Quality
control data are data on specific characteristics of recipients based on monthly samples of agency case
files. Finally, population figures have been computed by the authors, using microdata from the March
Current Population Survey (CPS).
Consulting several different sources of data is necessitated by the underreporting of AFDC receipt
in the CPS. The Census Bureau’s technical documentation states as much: “. . . from an analysis of
independently derived income estimates, it has been determined that wages and salaries tend to be much
better reported than such income types as public assistance. . .” (1993a, p. 9–4). A quick comparison of the
figures presented in Table 1, Panel A (using agency reports of AFDC receipt) and Table 1, Panel B (using
self-reports of receipt in the CPS) shows how severe the underreporting is. Underreporting is pervasive
among all three groups, but seems to be worse among whites and Hispanics.
Our time series of AFDC participation rates for the period 1983–1992 is presented in Table 1,
Panel A. For the period 1983–1989, we find the same small but gradual decline in the participation rate
that Moffitt and Jencks had uncovered throughout the mid- to late 1980s. However, beginning in 1990, the
trend in the overall participation rate began to turn around. In contrast to the gradual decline which had
been taking place since the early 1970s, in 1990, the AFDC participation rate began to increase and
continued to do so through 1992. The sudden upturn eroded the moderate progress that had been taking
place and in 1992, the AFDC participation rate reached its highest level in the last ten years.
When we examine racial and ethnic differences in participation rates, we see different patterns
emerging over this ten-year period.  Quite consistent with the overall pattern, the participation rates
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TABLE 1
AFDC Participation Rates among Female Heads of Families with Children under 18
A. Various Data Sources
Year Total Whites Blacks  Hispanics
1983 48 38 59 59
1984 47 37 57 58
1985 46 34 58 56
1986 46 35 55 57
1987 47 36 53 61
1988 46 35 51 63
1989 46 34 56 64
1990 47 34 55 67
1991 50 36 60 73
1992 52 39 58 78
B. Data Exclusively from the CPS
Year Total Whites Blacks  Hispanics
1983 31 20 43 42
1984 30 20 41 43
1985 30 21 42 44
1986 31 23 40 42
1987 31 22 40 42
1988 29 21 38 39
1989 27 20 35 34
1990 29 21 38 39
1991 31 24 41 39
1992 31 23 39 39
Sources: Panel A: U.S. House of Representatives 1993, p 685, Table 24; National Integrated Quality
Control System; U.S. Bureau of the Census, March CPS, 1984–1993; Panel B: Tabulations from U.S.
Bureau of the Census, March CPS, 1984–1993.5
among whites exhibit a gradual decline through the 1980s, but turn around and increase in 1991 and 1992.
The pattern of AFDC receipt among blacks shows a significant decline in participation taking place during
the 1980s; however, this is followed by an increase in participation rates after 1988. The participation rates
of Hispanics exhibit a decline during the mid-1980s, but differ from the other patterns of receipt in that
Hispanic participation rates began a sustained increase as early as 1987 and rose at a much faster pace
over the remaining six years. By 1992, AFDC participation rates of white and black female heads had
reached their 1983 levels, but participation rates among Hispanics had exceeded levels found in 1983 by
approximately twenty percentage points.
In addition to displaying different patterns of receipt over this ten-year period, Table 1, Panel A
also clearly reveals large racial differentials in participation rates. In 1983, participation rates among
blacks and Hispanics were found to be about twenty percentage points higher than among whites. However,
whereas black participation rates remained about twenty percentage points higher than white rates
throughout the period, by 1992, Hispanic participation rates were found to be twenty percentage points
above black rates and about forty percentage points above white rates.
WHAT FACTORS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE TRENDS IN PARTICIPATION?
Past research on the determinants of AFDC participation have pointed to the effects of the
socioeconomic attributes of female heads, social policy, and economic factors. No existing data permit a
multivariate analysis of the factors associated with trends in participation over the period from 1983
through 1992. The CPS, so useful for the analyses of other social trends, has weaknesses in its data on
participation in AFDC; the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) relies on panels that cover
only a part of this time period. We can, however, examine trends in factors that might be associated with
the trends in participation rates. Such an analysis is not as satisfying as one that controls for alternative6
explanations simultaneously and tests for the statistical significance of relationships. A comparison of
trends does, however, allow us to identify some possible explanations of the trends in participation.
1. Socioeconomic Characteristics
First, we consider the demographic characteristics of female heads. If the composition of female
heads of families changes in such a way that socioeconomic attributes improve, then we might expect to see
participation rates going down. Conversely, if the socioeconomic characteristics of female heads
deteriorate, we might expect to see increases in participation rates, all other things being equal.
For instance, previous research has shown that higher levels of education (measured in years of
schooling) reduce the likelihood of AFDC receipt (Robins 1986, 1990). Similarly, the likelihood of AFDC
participation decreases as female heads mature in age (Robins 1986, 1990). Southern residence has a
negative effect on the likelihood of AFDC receipt as the result of stricter eligibility requirements and the
small benefit levels found in Southern states (Moffitt 1986; Robins 1986, 1990; Sandefur 1989). On the
other hand, having never been married increases the likelihood of AFDC receipt among female heads
(Robins 1990). Similarly, each additional child in a family increases the likelihood of AFDC participation
(Blank 1989; Robins 1990). Thus, if the composition of female heads and female-headed families changes
significantly across any of these (or other) dimensions, we may expect to see a corresponding change in
AFDC participation rates.
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for several demographic variables. The panels (A–H) exhibit
compositional differences among the three racial and ethnic groups. Of note are the cross-group differences
in urban location, region, education, marital status, number of children, poverty, and employment.
Across years, the tables show very little change in the characteristics of female heads and female-
headed families. This is true whether we consider all female heads of families or white, black,TABLE 2
Demographic Characteristics of Female Heads of Families with Children under 18
A. Metropolitan Location of Female Heads
                  Total                                     Whites                                    Blacks                                    Hispanics                
Suburban Central Outside Suburban Central Outside Suburban Central Outside Suburban Central Outside
Year Ring City SMSA Ring City SMSA Ring City SMSA Ring City SMSA
1988 29 38 34 36 21 44 18 55 27 25 59 16
1989 29 36 35 37 19 43 19 53 29 26 56 18
1990 29 35 36 36 19 45 18 53 29 30 55 15
1991 30 36 34 38 20 43 19 53 28 28 55 17
1992 29 36 35 38 19 43 18 53 29 27 57 17
B. Regional Distribution of Female Heads
                   Total                                       Whites                                    Blacks                                   Hispanics                
Year Northeast Midwest South West Northeast Midwest South West Northeast Midwest South West Northeast Midwest South West
1988 20 22 39 20 20 27 32 22 15 22 54 8 30 7 26 38
1989 19 22 39 20 20 26 33 21 16 22 54 8 27 7 27 40
1990 20 23 39 19 18 28 33 20 18 22 52 7 30 7 25 38
1991 20 24 38 19 20 29 31 21 17 23 54 6 27 5 26 41
1992 19 24 39 19 19 28 33 20 16 24 54 7 27 7 22 44
C. Educational Distribution of Female Heads
Less Less Less Less
Than High Than High Than High Than High
High School Some College High School Some College High School Some College High School Some College
Year School Degree College Degree School Degree College Degree School Degree College Degree School Degree College Degree
1988 30 40 21 10 21 42 25 12 33 41 20 6 55 28 13 5
1989 28 40 23 9 19 43 27 12 31 41 22 6 54 29 13 4
1990 28 40 23 9 20 43 25 13 32 41 23 5 57 26 13 4
1991 28 39 25 9 19 39 30 12 31 43 21 5 54 28 15 4
1992 26 39 26 9 19 39 31 12 28 43 24 6 50 30 16 4
(table continues)8
TABLE 2, continued
D. Percentage of Female Heads Who Have Never Married
Year Total Whites Blacks  Hispanics
1988 33 18 55 34
1989 33 18 54 36
1990 35 21 57 33
1991 36 21 58 36
1992 36 20 58 40
E. Mean Age of Female Heads
Year Total Whites Blacks  Hispanics
1988 34 34 32 34
1989 34 35 33 33
1990 34 34 33 34
1991 34 34 33 34
1992 34 35 33 33
F. Mean Number of Children in Families with Female Heads
Year Total Whites Blacks  Hispanics
1988 2.2 1.9 2.6 2.5
1989 2.2 1.9 2.5 2.6
1990 1.9 1.7 2.2 2.2
1991 1.9 1.7 2.2 2.3
1992 1.9 1.7 2.1 2.3
G. Percentage of Female Heads Who Worked Last Year
Year Total Whites Blacks  Hispanics
1988 68 77 60 52
1989 69 78 62 55
1990 69 77 62 52
1991 67 76 61 52
1992 66 74 59 54
H. Poverty Rates of Female Heads
Year Total Whites Blacks  Hispanics
1988 44 33 55 57
1989 42 31 52 55
1990 44 34 54 58
1991 46 34 58 58
1992 45 36 56 55
Source: Tabulations from U.S. Bureau of the Census, March CPS, 1989–1993.  9
and Hispanic female heads separately. This is not surprising given such a brief period of observation. The
only changes worthy of mention seem to be the increase in never married female heads and the decline in
number of children in families. These changes, by themselves, cannot account for the increase in
participation rates found in Table 1.
2. Social Policy
Changes in social policy involving eligibility requirements, deductions, and benefit levels affected
rates of participation in the past, the most notable example being the Omnibus Reconciliation Act (OBRA)
of 1981.
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The Family Support Act (FSA), passed in October 1988, constitutes the only change in the AFDC
program between 1987 and 1992. The act increased the deductions which could be taken for work expenses
and child care and stated that child care disregards would be assessed after other disregards. Although the
FSA, like the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, did change the structure of benefits, its impact was minor,
especially compared with changes brought about by the OBRA legislation. This piece of legislation is
probably not responsible for the increase in participation rates.
Changes in the real value of benefits may also affect patterns of AFDC receipt. Indeed, Moffitt
(1986) and Blank (1989) found that the likelihood of AFDC receipt increases with an increase in real
benefit levels. When discussing patterns in the real value of AFDC benefits, one should also discuss
patterns in the real value of food stamps. All AFDC recipients are eligible to receive food stamps, and
roughly 90 percent of female heads on AFDC actually receive them (Census Bureau 1995a, 1995b; U.S.
House of Representatives 1994, p. 409). We include food stamps in our analysis and feel the inclusion is
important for two reasons: It better reflects the whole package of benefits that one receives when enrolling
in the AFDC program, and second, food stamps complement AFDC benefits and vary inversely with them.10
Thus, concentrating only on AFDC benefits would ignore the offsetting contribution of food stamps and
give one an exaggerated view of trends in benefit levels.
The same argument applies to Medicaid. All AFDC recipients are eligible to receive Medicaid
benefits. Medicaid benefits are thus part of the package of benefits to which an AFDC recipient is entitled.
Including Medicaid benefits would give us a better idea of the total dollar value of the benefit package and
would better reflect the incentives behind enrolling in AFDC. Unfortunately, computing the value of
Medicaid benefits is difficult since their value depends in part on the medical needs of the family. Data on
Medicaid expenditures exist, but this is not a measure of value as much as it is a measure of how often and
to what extent people get sick or have accidents. Our omission of a measure of potential Medicaid benefits
means that we have understated the value of the complete benefit package and have not captured all of the
fluctuation in its real value.
In Table 3, we examine participation rates alongside patterns in AFDC benefit levels and food
stamps.  Although AFDC participation rates rose six percentage points between 1988 and 1992, the figures
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presented in Table 3 show that real AFDC benefit levels fall consistently from one year to the next, as
states did not sufficiently adjust AFDC benefits for inflation. The cumulative result is a 13 percent
decrease in real value. Although this drop is in part compensated for by real increases in food stamp
benefits, it is only a partial compensation. Over the period of observation, the real value of the AFDC/food
stamp benefit package dropped by $16, representing a 2 percent decline. This is consistent with Moffitt’s
(1992) finding of a small decrease in real AFDC/food stamp benefits throughout the 1980s.
Benefit/earnings ratios give us an idea of how benefits compare to expected earnings. Earnings are
expressed as the median real monthly earnings of all working female heads. These ratios presented in Table
3 are shown to be quite small, demonstrating that working is a superior option to AFDC receipt. However,
as mentioned above, the benefit package does not include a measure of Medicaid eligibility, thus the ratios
are downward-biased. They are further biased downward due to the tremendous amount of selectivity
among those working. Women with the most to earn will be11
TABLE 3
AFDC Participation Rates and Related Variables, 1988–1992
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
AFDC Participation Rates of Female
Heads with Children under 18 46 46 47 50 52
Real Monthly Benefits
a
AFDC 426 407 391 378 372
Food stamps 237 238 254 270 275
Sum 663 645 645 648 647
Benefit/Earnings
b
AFDC .30 .31 .29 .28 .29
Sum .47 .50 .48 .47 .50
Other AFDC Parameters
Benefit reduction rate (%) 100 100 100 100 100
c
Break-even level 426 407 391 378 372
Sources: AFDC benefits, food stamp benefits: U.S. House of Representatives, p. 410; U.S. House of
Representatives 1989, p. 540; U.S. House of Representatives 1990, p. 555; U.S. House of Representatives
1991, p. 598; U.S. House of Representatives 1992, p. 637; Earnings: Tabulations from U.S. Bureau of the
Census, March CPS, 1989–1993.
In 1992 dollars. Benefit level of median state for family with one adult, two children, and no earners.
a




those most likely to seek employment. In addition, earnings is calculated for all female heads and, as we
shall see below, is not indicative of what AFDC recipients can expect to earn.
Our benefit/earnings ratios are somewhat smaller than Moffitt’s. Our ratios demonstrate only
minor fluctuations during the late 1980s and early 1990s, partly because there was little inflation that
decreased the value of benefits in this period. Relative to earnings, real benefit levels have not demonstrated
any significant change between 1988 and 1992.
Turning to the benefit reduction rate, we see that after twelve months of receiving AFDC, the rate
is set at 100 percent.  That is, after twelve months of participation, AFDC benefits are reduced on a one-
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for-one basis with each dollar of earned income, starting with the first dollar. Since one dollar in benefits is
subtracted for every dollar in earnings, it does not behoove a recipient to work unless she can generate
earnings well above the AFDC guarantee level or what Moffitt earlier referred to as the break-even level
($372 in 1992). The break-even level represents the level of earnings at which earners lose all of their
AFDC benefits. However, these break-even levels are biased downward since they do not take into account
the contribution of food stamps or Medicaid benefits.  Given the 100 percent reduction rate, the break-even
6
levels simply reflect the decline in the real value of AFDC benefits. In light of prior research findings, it is
not very likely that the recent trend in benefit levels, exhibited in Table 3, can account for the recent upturn
in participation rates. If anything, we would expect to witness slightly lower participation rates.
3. Economic Conditions
Economic conditions may also affect participation rates. As hinted at above, inflationary pressures
may erode the real value of AFDC benefits and make AFDC receipt less attractive. High rates of inflation
during the 1970s severely depressed the real value of benefits. During the period 1975–1981, in which the
average annual rate of inflation was 9.2 percent, Moffitt found participation rates dropped from 62 percent
to 53 percent. However, inflation rates were quite low between 1988 and 1992. As demonstrated in Table13
3, inflation had only a minor depressive effect on the real value of AFDC benefits and cannot plausibly
account for the sudden increase in participation rates.
  Of course, economic conditions have consequences for the labor force as well. The condition of the
economy affects people’s ability to find work, and consequently, it is likely to affect rates of participation
in the AFDC program.
Table 4 examines patterns among labor force indicators.  We will first discuss patterns across
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groups and then patterns across time. Immediately, we see that only a small proportion of AFDC recipients
report that they work: only 6–7 percent report being employed. Of those working, only about a third work
full-time. Finally, real monthly earnings among employed AFDC recipients are quite low, in the $330–$340
range. All of these findings are consistent with those produced by Moffitt for the mid-1980s.
Other research, however, suggests that the fraction of single mothers on AFDC who work is much
higher. Harris (1993), using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) found that at any given
point in time, about one-third of welfare mothers were working and that over time, in a spell of welfare,
one-half of all single mothers had some contact with the labor market. Spalter-Roth, Burr, Hartmann, and
Shaw (1995), using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), found that most
welfare recipients worked, with the most common jobs being maids, cashiers, nursing aids, child care
workers, and waitresses. Edin (1995), relying on personal interviews with welfare recipients, found that a
substantial percentage of AFDC recipients engaged in covert work.
The percentage of AFDC recipients who report that they work is low in part due to provisions in
the 1981 OBRA, which made reported work largely incompatible with welfare receipt and effectively
pushed many wage earners off the welfare rolls or into a situation in which they had to conceal their
earnings.  However, Moffitt reports that only 14–18 percent of AFDC recipients reported that they were
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working before OBRA 1981 was enacted.14
TABLE 4
Labor Force Indicators for Female Heads with Children under 18 and
Other Women in the United States, 1988–1992
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
AFDC Female Heads with Children under 18
Percentage working 6 7 7 6 6
Percentage working full-time 33 35 37 34 34
a
Real monthly earnings 327 335 341 334 330
b
All Female Heads with Children under 18
Percentage working 55 57 55 54 54
Percentage working full-time 84 83 82 81 82
c
Hours of work per week 38 38 37 37 37
d
Women over 16, percentage working
All 51 52 51 51 51
Never married 58 59 57 57 56
Married, spouse present 53 54 53 54 54
Divorced or separated 64 66 64 63 63
Unemployment rate 5.5 5.3 5.5 6.7 7.4
Sources: AFDC female heads: U.S. House of Representatives, 1992, p. 671; U.S. House of
Representatives 1993, p. 701; U.S. House of Representatives 1994, pp. 404, 406. All female heads, other
women: Tabulations from U.S. Bureau of the Census, March CPS, 1989–1993.
Of those working. “Full time” defined as 30 hours a week.
a
Median earnings of the with earned income, in 1992 dollars.
b




Returning to Table 4, we see that the labor force patterns of all female heads with children stand in
stark contrast to the patterns among the subset of female heads receiving AFDC. Female heads are shown
to work and to work full-time in very large proportions. Roughly 55 percent are employed, and of those
working, more than 80 percent work full-time.  These findings for all female heads are consistent with
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those reported by Moffitt for the 1980s, although he finds only 75 percent of working female heads to be
working full-time.
The employment patterns of female heads of families are comparable to those of all women. The
percentage of female heads who are employed surpasses the percentage among all women and is
comparable to the percentage among married women.
In terms of trends over time, the reported employment patterns of AFDC recipients remain stable
over the five-year period, as do real monthly earnings. In terms of the percentage of women working, the
employment patterns of female heads with children and of all women also seem to be quite stable over the
period. None of these trends seem to mirror the increase in AFDC participation rates. Thus, the increase in
participation rates does not appear to be associated with reported employment among women.
Only the trend in the national unemployment rate seems to correspond with the trend in the AFDC
participation rate. In Table 4, we see that the unemployment rate drops in 1989, but that it increases in
1990 and continues to climb upward every year afterward, reflecting a period of economic recession in
1991–1992. Interestingly enough, this is the same pattern found in participation rates: an increase
beginning in 1990 and continuing through 1992. Tracing unemployment rates back to 1983, a very
interesting picture emerges. Between 1983 and 1989, the unemployment rate falls every year, dropping
quite significantly from 9.6 in 1983 to 5.3 in 1989. As we had discussed earlier, during this same period,
1983–1989, AFDC participation rates fell, although not as significantly nor as consistently. Nonetheless,
both the unemployment rate and the AFDC participation rate began to rise precisely in 1990 and both16
continued to do so through 1992. The relative increases in the unemployment rate and participation rate
from one year to the next also seem to follow one another quite closely.
This pattern of association becomes more convincing when we consider the unemployment rates of
female heads of households. Table 5 presents unemployment rates for all civilians and for female heads of
families. The pattern of unemployment rates among female heads is very similar to the pattern for all
civilians. More significantly, the pattern of unemployment rates among female heads of families mirrors the
pattern of AFDC participation rates. Both unemployment rates and participation rates declined between
1983 and 1989, both begin to increase precisely in 1990, and both continue to increase through 1992. In
fact, between 1988 and 1992, the two patterns are remarkably similar in terms of timing and relative
changes from one year to the next.
Increased unemployment rates among female heads of families are highly associated with the
observed increase in AFDC participation rates between 1988 and 1992. It seems that the labor force
conditions experienced by female heads of families do indeed have implications for rates of participation in
the AFDC program. The connection is more clearly evident using unemployment rates rather than
percentages of female heads working.
Although this may account for the overall trend, we still have to ask why the increase in the
participation rate for Hispanics was so dramatic. A possible explanation for the different experience of
Hispanics lies in the impact of the early 1990s recession on states with high concentrations of Hispanics.
The unemployment rates in California and New York, the two states with the largest populations of
Hispanics, rose from 5.3 to 9.1 and 4.2 to 8.5, respectively, between 1988 and 1992, compared to the
increase from 5.5 to 7.4 for the nation as a whole. Florida and New Jersey, two other states with sizable
Hispanic populations, were also hit hard by the recession. Texas, the state with the third largest17
TABLE 5
AFDC Participation Rates among Female Heads of Families and Selected Unemployment Rates
              Unemployment Rate             
Year AFDC Participation Rate Total Female Heads of Families
1983 48 9.6 12.2
1984 47 7.5 10.3
1985 46 7.2 10.4
1986 46 7.0 9.8
1987 47 6.2 9.2
1988 46 5.5 8.1
1989 46 5.3 8.1
1990 47 5.5 8.2
1991 50 6.7 9.1
1992 52 7.4 9.9
Sources: U.S. House of Representatives 1993, p. 685, Table 24 and p. 529, Table 3; U.S. Bureau of the
Census, March CPS, 1984–1993.18
Hispanic population, was not hit as hard, and its unemployment rate went from 7.3 in 1988 to 7.5 in 1992.
CONCLUSIONS
Consistent with findings uncovered by Moffitt and Jencks, we found a gradual decline in AFDC
participation rates between 1983 and 1989. When we examined racial and ethnic differences in
participation rates, we found the same general pattern of reduced participation rates to exist among whites,
blacks, and Hispanics. Extending the analysis to 1992, we found the sixteen-year decline in participation
rates to suddenly turn around beginning in 1990. We found that participation rates have increased since
1990, and that by 1992, they existed at the highest level in at least ten years. We found this turnaround to
exist among all three groups, although we found the upturn to be most pronounced among Hispanics, and,
to a lesser extent, among whites.
The severe amount of underreporting of AFDC receipt in the CPS dissuaded us from conducting a
regression analysis with the CPS microdata. Our attempt to find factors associated with the above patterns
of AFDC receipt consisted of comparing trends in AFDC participation with trends in socioeconomic
characteristics, the real value of benefits, and labor force statistics. In the process, we updated several of
Moffitt’s earlier findings.
We found that the socioeconomic characteristics of female heads of families did not change much
over the period and do not show much, if any, association with the pattern of AFDC receipt. Between 1988
and 1992, changes in social policy were fairly minor and inflation remained relatively low. Thus, changes
in real benefit levels were found to be quite small and incongruous with the substantial increase in AFDC
participation rates.
We did, however, find the pattern of AFDC receipt to closely follow patterns in the unemployment
rate, and more specifically, patterns in the unemployment rate among female heads. The trends in the19
AFDC participation rate and the unemployment rate among female heads run parallel to one another for the
years 1988–1992. Thus, in the absence of any significant changes in social policy, benefit levels, or
demographic characteristics, it appears that the sudden increase in AFDC participation rates can be traced
to deteriorating economic conditions and increased unemployment rates.
What are the implications of our findings for assessing the likely effects of the passage of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996? The new law makes a number
of changes, but perhaps the most significant for discussion here are: (1) the end of the federal guarantee of
cash assistance for poor children replaced with block grants to each state to be used to provide Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF); each state is now free to decide what proportion of eligible
applicants for assistance it will support; (2) the head of every family must work within two years, or the
family loses all benefits; and, (3) lifetime benefits are limited to five years, but a state can impose stricter
limits if it chooses to do so.
Our findings have three major implications for the new regime of TANF that replaces AFDC.
First, when states experience periods of recession, they will face a double bind. The fraction of female
heads of families who apply for assistance will increase directly with the seriousness of the recession. At
the same time, the ability of the state to afford to support families needing TANF will decrease. The state
will be forced to choose between turning away needy families or increasing taxes in a time of recession to
support the increased costs of TANF in the state. Although the new federal law includes some provisions
for federal support of states experiencing difficulties, these provisions are unlikely to be sufficient to cover
serious recessions.
Second, the difficulty that TANF recipients will have in finding employment within two years will
be much greater in areas with high unemployment and/or in periods of high unemployment. States will be
forced to make decisions about providing support to families where the head has made serious efforts to
find employment, but has been unsuccessful. Third, the proportion of families who have exhausted their20
eligibility but are still in need of assistance will be greatly increased during a recession, placing increased
demands on the Food Stamp program and private charities.21
The participation rates estimated by Jencks, Moffitt, and us vary in minor ways because each
1
effort used slightly different methods of calculating the number of AFDC recipients and the number of
female-headed families. The three sets of time series do, however, agree with one another in terms of the
direction of the trend and the relative changes over time.
Moffitt includes in his count of female heads with children all female-headed families with children,
including subfamilies. Jencks, on the other hand, counts households with children and female heads. We
include female heads of households with children under 18 and female heads of families with children under
18 living in male-headed households. We do not include female heads of families living in a female-headed
household since the AFDC program considers this to be one unit.
We use the same approach as Moffitt to counting the numbers of AFDC recipients. Jencks
excludes those AFDC families with an incapacitated head and AFDC recipients in Puerto Rico, Guam, and
the Virgin Islands. The numbers of these recipients are not large enough to make much difference in the
counts each year, and they are difficult to identify in some years. The important point is that these minor
differences in calculating the participation rates do not affect the pattern in the trend.
Neither Moffitt nor Jencks estimated participation rates for racial and ethnic groups. For the
2
period 1989–1992, we have detailed information on the racial composition of the AFDC-UP caseload and
of the total AFDC caseload. Such information does not exist for the 1983–1988 period. The racial
compositions do indeed differ, with whites being represented in the AFDC-UP program at much higher
proportions and blacks and Hispanics at much lower proportions. In order to estimate rates for the racial
and ethnic groups for the 1983–1988 period, we assume that the racial distribution of the AFDC caseload
for female heads of household was the same as the racial distribution for the total AFDC caseload during
each of these years.
If we had used this procedure for the 1989–1992 period, we would have estimated the following
participation rates:
Year Total Whites Blacks  Hispanics
1989 46 35 54 63
1990 47 35 53 66
1991 50 37 57 71
1992 52 40 55 77
Notes22
Compared to the last four rows in Table 1, Panel A, we see that the participation rates of whites would
have been larger, while the participation rates of blacks and Hispanics would have been smaller. However,
the differences are not drastic, and more importantly, the trends in participation rates remain intact.
According to former DHHS Assistant Secretary Richard Rubin, 408,000 families lost eligibility
3
and 299,000 families lost benefits as a result of the OBRA legislation (U.S. House of Representatives
1994, p. 439). Moffitt (1992) found participation rates dropped from 53 percent to 44 percent one year
after implementation.
Table 3 parallels Table 3 in Moffitt (1992).
4
Prior to OBRA 1981, a 67 percent benefit reduction rate was levied on all monthly earnings above
5
$30. The 1981 act limited these provisions to the first four months of receipt, after which the $30 disregard
was eliminated and the benefit reduction rate was increased to 100 percent. The $30 disregard has since
been extended to the first twelve months of receipt.
It is difficult to compute a break-even level which considers AFDC, food stamps, and Medicaid.
6
There is a 30 percent benefit reduction rate in food stamps for every dollar of countable cash income
received (whether it be from earnings or AFDC). However, food stamps may still be received after a family
loses eligibility for AFDC. Similarly, families may still be eligible for Medicaid after losing eligibility for
AFDC. Medicaid may be received for up to twelve months after a family leaves AFDC. However,
individual states can determine levels of Medicaid benefits during the last six months.
Table 4 parallels Table 4 in Moffitt (1992).
7
Among other things, OBRA 1981 put caps on the deductions one could take for work-related
8
expenses and child care. As mentioned earlier, OBRA also limited disregards on earnings from employment
and increased the benefit reduction rate to 100 percent.
The large discrepancy in full-time employment exists in spite of the fact that full-time is defined as
9
30-plus hours of work for AFDC recipients and 35-plus hours of work for all female heads.23
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